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1. Introduction
Cybersecurity is a combination of various 
technologies and processes that protect the 
computing and networked systems from 
potential damage caused by hackers. One way 
to achieve security is by employing different 
encryption techniques. Advanced encryption 
standard (AES) [1] is one of the widely used 
symmetric encryption algorithms. The 
hardware of the AES is dominated by 
substitution box (S-box). The S-box is prone to 
differential power analysis (DPA) attack due 
to its large power consumption. The power 
consumption of cryptographic hardware is not 
constant during execution [2]. The simple 
power analysis recovers information directly 
by observation of the power consumption of a 
device [3], whereas the differential power 
analysis uses statistical correlations between 
the power consumption of the module and the 
input data [4] to recover the information.  
Different countermeasures to DPA attacks 
are available in the literature [5], but they are 
not suitable to implement devices because 
power consumption is the major design 
constraint. Adiabatic logic is one of the   
low-power and secure design technique [6] 
due to its energy recovery principle. 
The scaling of technology leads to 
threshold voltage reduction and consequent 
increase in leakage current. This will impact 
the energy recovery of the adiabatic logic 
circuits implemented using CMOS [7] and 
DPA attacks. Hence there is a need to 
investigate novel low-power and secure 
devices to be useful for these applications. 
Among different devices available, FinFET is 
the prominent device with reduced leakage 
current [8]. 
One of the significant challenges in 
today’s electronic circuit design is lowering 
the power consumption of the computation. 
With the widespread use of internet of things 
(IoT), there is an increasing demand for low 
power and    high-security devices. In General, 
the IoT devices are operated with a battery. So, 
battery life is the primary design consideration 
while designing battery operated systems. 
These devices are operated at low-frequency 
range, for example, the operating frequency of 
radio frequency ID (RFID) is 13.56 MHz [9]. 
Adiabatic logic circuits are proven to be 
effectively operated at these frequencies. 
Among different logic families, FinFET based 
ECRL adiabatic logic is chosen as it offers 
better energy savings [10]. The prime 
objective of this work is to design energy 
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efficient three-stage Positive Polarity       
Reed-Muller (PPRM) S-box. The basic 
building blocks of S-box are inverter/ buffer, 
XOR/XNOR and NAND/AND gates. These 
are implemented with FinFET based ECRL 
logic, and the S-box is then synthesized. 
Simulations are carried out with 45 nm 
FinFET BSIM-CMG model using virtuoso 
design environment. The performance of 
ECRL S-box is compared with conventional 
CMOS S-box over a wide range of supply 
voltages and frequencies. This paper is 
structured as follows; section 2 presents the 
background of adiabatic logic and introduction 
about FinFET is given in section 3. Section 4 
shows the 3-stage PPRM implementation with 
FinFET. Finally, results and conclusions are 
given in sections 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
2. Adiabatic Logic 
  
The term adiabatic is a reversible 
thermodynamic process that occurs without 
loss or gain of energy. Unlike, the traditional 
power sources used by conventional CMOS 
logic circuits, adiabatic logic uses power clock 
to achieve efficient recycling of the charge 
stored in load capacitor.  
This energy recycling minimizes the dynamic 
switching energy loss. The charging and 
discharging processes of adiabatic logic are 
shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1   Adiabatic charging and discharging. 
 
The energy dissipated in an adiabatic circuit 
when the charge is supplied from a constant 
current source is given as in Eq. 1. The 
effective resistance of the driven device is R, 
and C is the load capacitance. 
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The adiabatic losses show that the speed of 
operation impacts the energy dissipation as 
given in Eq. 2. 
 
   )2(2dd
on
adia VC
T
CR
E   
 
where Ron is on resistance of the device. The 
non-adiabatic losses are frequency 
independent, and they are mainly due to 
variation in threshold voltage, Vth. The relation 
between non-adiabatic energy loss and the 
threshold voltage is given as in Eq. 3. 
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The leakage losses in adiabatic logic are 
due to rapid shrinking of transistors and 
mainly occur during evaluation, hold and 
recovery. The leakage energy consumption per 
cycle is given in Eq. 4.  
 
   )4(
1
f
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where, Ileak is the mean current and f is the 
power clock frequency. From Eq. 4, it is 
evident that the leakage   energy is inversely 
proportional to frequency.   
Various adiabatic logic families including 
positive feedback adiabatic logic (PFAL) [13], 
ECRL [14], clocked adiabatic logic (CAL) 
[15] and two-phase clocked CMOS adiabatic 
logic (2PC2AL) [16] are reported in literature. 
As the security is also one of the to days major 
consideration, extensive research is available 
in literature. The circuit complexity in terms of 
number of devices and power clocks, 
reliability are the limitations of the secure 
adiabatic logic families. As there is minimum 
complexity and power dissipation, ECRL logic 
is chosen to implement the three-stage PPRM 
S-box [10]. The ECRL buffer/inverter shown 
in Fig. 2.  
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Fig. 2   ECRL buffer/ inverter. 
 
The structure consists of two cross-coupled 
PMOS devices P1 and P2 to store the 
information and NMOS devices for 
implementing the logic. The power supply is 
Vpc and IN, INb, and OUT, OUTb is true and 
complementary input signals and outputs 
respectively. The simulated transient response 
and peak current trace of ECRL buffer/inverter 
are given in Fig. 3. The current trace shows 
uniform peak current for ‘1’ to ‘0’ and ‘0’ to 
‘1’ transitions. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3   ECRL buffer/ inverter a) Transient 
response b) Peak current trace of ECRL 
buffer/ inverter. 
 
3. FinFET Technology 
 
FinFET consists of a very lean silicon body 
formed perpendicular to the plane of the wafer 
and having a three-dimensional structure. The 
current ﬂows parallel to the wafer plane [13]. 
Fig. 4 shows the structure of FinFET with the 
channel is surrounded from three sides by the 
gate. In this structure Wfin is the width of the 
fin, Hfin is fin height, and Lg is gate length. The 
device can provide powerful control over the 
channel and suppress the short channel effects 
(SCEs).Hence FinFET offers lower leakage, 
higher on-state current and faster-switching 
speed. The leakage current is found to be of 
the order of Pico amperes. The multi-gate 
nature allows FinFET to be operated in three 
different modes, namely, independent gate 
(IG), shorted gate (SG) and low-power (LP) 
modes. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Structure of FinFET. 
4. PPRM S-Box 
 
Cryptography is an essential tool for protecting 
information in computer systems. National 
institute of standards and technology (NIST) 
selected advanced encryption standard (AES) 
based on Rijndael algorithm [14] as data 
encryption standard according to the primary 
criteria of security, performance, and 
efficiency. AES is one of the widely used 
algorithms for different applications like 
wireless sensor networks (WSN) and IoT. The 
efficiency of AES hardware depends on its 
architecture [15]. The AES implementation is 
shown in Fig. 5.  
In general, there are two methods for       
S-box circuit implementation, (i) construction 
of multiplicative inverse and affine transform 
in an independent manner and connecting 
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them serially, which reduces area with 
composite field arithmetic [16] and (ii) 
construction of a single circuit. In this 
technique, S-box is implemented from truth 
table itself as the sum of products (SoP), a 
product of sums (PoS), and PPRM [17]. 
Among these two techniques, the PPRM S-box 
consumes more power compared to composite 
field S-box due to a large number of signal 
transition probabilities. This problem can be 
avoided by taking three sub-components of 
composite field S-box and convert them to 
PPRM form, namely, the   pre-inversion, 
inversion and post-inversion sections as 
depicted in Fig. 6. Each section when 
implemented with two-level AND and XOR 
arrays reduces the signal transition probability, 
thus leading to efficient utilization of power 
[18-19]. PPRM form, also called the zero 
polarity form is a XOR sum of products where 
each variable is in un-complemented form. 
Any n-variable logic function is represented in 
PPRM form as given in Eq. 5. 
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In this x0 - xn-1 are Boolean variables and 
b0 - b2n-1 are the corresponding coefficients.
 
 
Fig. 5   Standard implementation of AES and 
power consumption of each block. 
 
 
Fig. 6   Mapping of composite field S-box to 
three-stage PPRM S-box a) Composite field b) 
PPRM. 
The two-input ECRL AND/NAND, 
XOR/XNOR gates using FinFET is shown in 
Fig. 7. The front gate of the FinFET is used as 
input, while the back gate of P FinFET is 
connected to Vpc and N FinFET to ground for 
low power operation. With the structure of 
conventional XOR gate, the transition 
probability of the output depends largely upon 
the input. In-order to reduce this dependency, 
a control signal ‘S’ is used. In this X and Y are 
dual inputs and OUT and OUTb are the 
outputs with Vpc as four-phase power clock 
supply. 
 
Fig. 7   Two-input ECRL a) AND/NAND gate 
b) XOR/XNOR gate using FinFET. 
 
The simulated transient response and peak 
current trace of ECRL AND/NAND gate is 
shown in Fig. 8. The circuit has dual inputs A, 
B and outputs OUT and OUTb. The current 
trace plot of the circuit shows same peak value 
of current and also exhibits uniform           
low-power dissipation for different input 
transitions. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 8   ECRL AND/NAND gate a) Transient 
response b) Peak current trace. 
 
The simulated transient analysis and the 
peak current trace of XOR/XNOR gate is 
depicted in Fig.9. The structure given will 
ensure a uniform peak current for the input 
transitions. Thus there is less probability for 
the hacker to predict the input data in cyber 
security hardware. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 9   ECRL XOR/XNOR gate a) Transient 
response b) Peak current trace. 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
Simulations are carried out on both CMOS and 
FinFET based ECRL 8-bit S-box circuits using 
45nm BSIM-CMG model. The device 
parameters chosen for CMOS are L=45nm, 
W=90nm, and Vth=0.6V, while for FinFET, 
L=45nm, Tfin=15nm, Hfin=30nm, Tox=1nm and 
Vth= 0.4V. The width of the FinFET device is 
obtained from the following relation. 
 
)6(2 finfinfin THW   
 
The supply voltage is varied from 0.5 to 1V 
and the input power clock frequency from 
0.001 to 100 MHz. Table 1 gives a comparison 
of the area between CMOS and ECRL FinFET 
implementations. The results indicate an area   
reduction of 11.6% with ECRL FinFET circuit. 
 
 
Table 1 Area comparison of CMOS and 
FinFET based ECRL S-box. 
No. of devices CMOS FinFET  
PMOS 
transistors 
1842 798 
NMOS 
transistors 
1842 2458 
Area (nm2) 0.0149 0.0138 
 
Fig. 10 shows   the   histogram   of   
average   power dissipation with frequency 
and effect of supply voltage scaling on power 
dissipation. Power savings of the order of     
22-66% are achieved with FinFET relative to 
CMOS over a frequency band of 0.001 to 100 
MHz.  
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Fig. 10   PPRM S-box a) Power dissipation 
with power clock frequency, b) Supply voltage 
scaling effect on power dissipation. 
 
The S-box is simulated at a 12.5 MHz 
frequency to demonstrate its usage in     
contact-less smart card applications. Table 2 
shows the comparison of power   dissipation, 
delay, and energy dissipation over a cycle at 
12.5 MHz, and Vpc of 0.7V. The power 
dissipation and   delay results of the present 
study are compared in table 3 with different 
technology nodes at 10 MHz frequency. 
 
Table 2 Comparison of S-box performance 
parameters. 
Parameter CMOS FinFET  
Power 
dissipation 
(µW) 
11.28 5.91 
Delay (nS) 1.19 2.5 
Energy 
dissipation 
(fJ) 
1024 726.3 
 
Table 3 Power dissipation and delay 
comparison of 8-bit S-box circuit for different 
technology nodes at 10 MHz frequency. 
Reference Technology 
 node 
Power 
dissipation 
(µW) 
Delay 
(nS) 
[17] 180nm 
(MOSFET) 
51 1.86 
[18] 180nm 
(MOSFET) 
28 - 
This 
work 
45nm 
(FinFET) 
6.06   2.5 
 
Further, to validate our design to DPA attacks, 
statistical analysis of normalized energy 
deviation (NED) and normalized standard 
deviation (NSD) are carried out by measuring 
energy dissipation as follows. 
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0
tItVE pc
T
pcdiss   
 
where Ipc is the supply current, NED and NSD 
determine the ability of the design against 
power analysis attacks depending upon the 
input transitions. 
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where E is the average energy dissipation and 
is given in Eq. 10. 
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The standard deviation is defined as in Eq. 11. 
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Emax, Emin, and n are the maximum energy, 
minimum energy, and number of energy 
samples respectively. The parameter NED 
shows the difference in maximum and 
minimum energy levels irrespective of input 
transitions. Similarly, NSD determines the 
similarity of various energy level transitions 
concerning mean energy level. Lowest values 
of NSD and NED indicate the ability of the 
logic against DPA attacks. From the results of 
the ECRL FinFET 8-bit S-box circuit 
summarised in table 4 it is observed that in the 
medium frequency range, up to about 50MHz, 
the designed S-box is more resistant to DPA 
attacks. Table 4shows the calculated values of 
NED and NSD of designed S-box circuit. 
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Table 4 Simulation and calculated values of 
energy of ECRL FinFET 8-bit S-box circuit 
for different input power clock frequencies 
 
To assess the designed S-box circuit 
reliability with temperature, the change in 
power dissipation with temperature is analysed 
over the range of 20-1000C is shown in Fig. 
11. The power dissipation trend for a CMOS 
based    S-box is exponential in nature, and it 
is found to be of the order of nW, whereas, for 
FinFET circuit the power dissipation exhibits a 
linear relationship with increase in temperature 
and is in the range of pW. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 11 Effect of temperature on power 
dissipation of ECRL S-Box a) CMOS and b) 
FinFET circuit. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this work, various design possibilities are 
explored to minimize the power consumption 
of S-box circuit. To achieve the design target, 
a three-stage PPRM based S-box is 
implemented with CMOS and FinFET based 
ECRL logic. Various performance parameters 
such as power dissipation, area are measured 
with supply voltage scaling and input 
frequency. Results indicate an improvement in 
power savings of the order of 22-66% in 
0.001-100 MHz frequency range for the 
FinFET based ECRL logic over CMOS circuit. 
Further, the designed S-box consumes uniform 
transitional energy dissipation up to about 50 
MHz, and exhibits similar peak supply current 
trace which improves the resistant to DPA 
attacks, thus making it suitable for low-power 
and secures devices in low-frequency bands, 
such as RFID tags, contact-less smart cards, 
IoT and wireless sensors. 
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